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tricksters, troubadours—and bartleby                    
On Art from a State of Emergency Jean Fisher  
Debates on the relationship of artistic practice 
to the sociopolitical sphere have gained 
momentum as the more immiserating effects 
of globalisation have extended ‘states of 
emergency’ beyond their earlier restriction to 
colonial geographies. My interest in this issue 
stems from a long engagement with artists 
emerging from a political history of colonial 
violence and cultural dispossession, whose 
work may be described as an aesthetics of 
resistance against the truth claims of repressive 
regimes. A constellation of questions presents 
itself, among them: Do these practices differ 
from social activism in their affect? Do they 
offer a means to reclaim political agency? How 
might one characterise the tropes they employ? 
This presentation focuses on a particular set of 
tropes associated with the Hermetic [see below;
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ed.] or hermeneutic play of the ‘trickster’ and the ‘troubadour’: encountering, 
trespassing, vectoring and opportunism.
In his essay ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’ Walter Benjamin 
states, “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” 
in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”1 I read this from the 
perspective of colonised peoples deprived of ancestral belonging, self-
representation and political agency, and subjected to extraordinarily 
repressive laws by the occupying power. This violence against the colonised 
‘other’ diminishes the humanity of this latter by framing it within a reality not 
of its own making. It is also a betrayal by the law and language of dominance 
of its Enlightenment promise of universal franchise—a violation of principle 
that could only be rationalised by reducing the colonised to the status of 
less-than-human. From the point of view of the disenfranchised, resistance 
to power—or, more accurately, force—implies agency, which demands 
a proactive subject. The problem is that, according to the Foucauldian 
schema, the subject is not only oppressed by power but is itself its product, 
suggesting that the subject is always somehow complicit in its subjugation. 
However, this says nothing about the potential for resistance. How could 
one imagine a politically viable agency capable of exiting from this impasse? 
Short of armed resistance, Frantz Fanon insisted it was impossible to do 
so by a melancholy retreat into some lost or fragmented past identity. One 
had to begin by recognising the dynamics of repression and reconfiguring 
social narratives from the conditions of the present, a role he assigned to the 
intellectual and storyteller.2 To reclaim agency means re-founding a place 
of dwelling in and against dominant language; to be ‘at home’ is first to be 
at home in a language capable of re-imagining a meaningful existence not 
defined by trauma and victimhood. Only then could one turn a sceptical eye 
upon the truth claims of policing regimes. For Edward Said the intellectual 
had a responsibility to speak truth to power: to give voice to un-freedom 
and injustice.3 But how does one do that when power is deaf, indifferent 
or illiberal? If one alternative is to turn aside from power, is this also not 
an abdication of political agency, since agency requires taking a position, 
however contingent, in relation to power? So, is there such a thing as a 
position without complicity, or resistance without violent confrontation? 
1. Walter Benjamin, 
‘Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,’ 
in Illuminations, 
trans. Harry Zohn, 
(New York: Schocken 
Books, 1969), 257.
2. Frantz Fanon, 
The Wretched of the 
Earth, [1961], trans. 
Constance Farrington, 
(Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1985), 193. 
3. Edward W. 
Said, ‘Speaking 
Truth to Power,’ in 
Representations of the 
Intellectual, (London: 
Vintage, 1994), 65.
One way out of this impasse is to say that hegemonic power is not 
absolute. Neither is subjectivity. The distribution of power within the 
social sphere may be controlled by a hegemonic discourse, but this does 
not preclude pockets of resentment, latent counter-hegemonies, or wars 
of position. For instance, for the colonial subject dispossessed by force, 
resistance had, of necessity, to operate clandestinely at the micro-social level. 
An example is syncretism in santería, the Afro-Cuban plantation religion, 
where a Catholic saint was mapped over or merged with a prohibited 
Yoruban orisha: one might be looking at St Anthony of Padua but appealing 
to Eleggúa, keeper of the crossroads. This constituted a political gesture 
insofar as it was a tactic of apparent conformity while retaining some 
measure of self-empowerment; a means of working within the framework of 
power without fully subscribing to its truths. At the same time, this opens 
onto the domain of ambivalence, where something cannot be determined 
as one thing or another, and whose value is firstly emotional. Naturally, it 
has been the drive of Western rationalism to eliminate such troublesome 
uncertainties.
What is notable in the santería example is that cultural resistance 
worked through a re-motivation of visual and material signs. (Incidentally, 
this has a bearing on debates over whether globalisation leads to the 
homogenisation of art, or whether the ‘local’ resignifies the ‘global’ on its 
own terms, as suggested by Gerardo Mosquera.)4 It is this thought of re-
motivation that I want to carry over into questions of art’s affective capacity 
to challenge hegemonic truth claims. At a more fundamental level, this is to 
ask: how and what does art communicate, if anything? 
Adorno notes that an artwork is not to be explained “in terms of the 
categories of communication,”5 contrary to the assumption, prevalent 
in oppositional activist art, that images are directly communicable. This 
assumption does not account for either the inherent polysemy of words 
and images or the haptic, synaesthetic means by which art captures 
understanding. By contrast, poetics mobilises this indeterminacy to 
interrupt the signifying chain and disarticulate conventional meanings, 
potentially opening up new pathways of thought. In light of this, we can 
correlate art making with the trickster. A trickster tale illustrates the point: 
4. Gerardo Mosquera, 
‘Alien-Own/Own-Alien,’ 
in Nikos Papastergiadis, 
ed. Complex 
Entanglements: Art, 
Globalisation and 
Cultural Difference, 
(London: Rivers Oram, 
2003), 18 – 29. 
5. Theodor Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, trans. 
Robert Hullot-Kentor, 
(London: Athlone Press, 
1999), 109.
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6. Paul Radin, The 
Trickster: A Study 
in American Indian 
Mythology, (New 
York: Schocken 
Books, 1972), 28.
7. Catherine 
Clément, Syncope: 
The Philosophyof 
Rapture, trans. Sally 
O’Driscoll and 
Deirdre M. Mahoney, 
(Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University 
Press, 1994), 5, 
236 – 250. 
8. Etymologically, 
a kõan is a judge’s 
bench—a place of 
adjudication and 
decision, placing 
paradox at the heart 
of the law.
In a famous episode from the Winnebago narrative cycle,6 trickster sees 
some plums in a stream and dives in to get them, but only brings up stones. 
On the next attempt he knocks himself out on the rocky bottom. When he 
comes to, he is floating face-up in the water, from which position he then 
sees the real plums in the overhanging tree. That is, trickster discovers a new 
insight—the difference between a thing and its representation—through 
a momentary loss of consciousness and change in perspective. This is 
analogous to Catherine Clément’s description of syncope—a suspended 
moment in time—as the condition for creative insight;7 that is, a suspension 
of everyday subjectivity triggered by an encounter with uncertainty (the 
‘otherness’ of the situation), and a key to understanding how an event of art 
might provoke a new thought. 
James Coleman’s early work possessed a non-didactic political resonance 
that was difficult to pin down, although one might detect veiled allusions 
to the legacy of Anglo-Irish colonial relations. One particularly affective 
work, which induced an unaccountable sense of loss and uncertainty, was 
A-Kõan, 1976. It consisted of an 8mm looped colour film projection of 
the Irish tricolour flapping on a flagpole over a cluster of public address 
speakers. The accompanying soundtrack mixed a rumbling bass note with 
a child’s voice calling plaintively: ‘Mummy, I’m ready/ I’ve done a poo/ I’m 
calling you…’ The title is a phonetic pun on two meanings of ‘a koan’. One is 
the enigmatic or paradoxical Zen Buddhist saying that cannot be grasped by 
logical reasoning, but can be realised by sense; its purpose is to dislocate and 
free the mind from habitual ideas of reality according to the given laws of 
society.8 ‘Acoan’ is a Gaelic word meaning ‘keening’—a lament or lullaby. We 
are therefore given an audiovisual experience that oscillates across several 
undecidable registers between comedy and pathos. For Irish audiences at 
the time it suggested the celebration of Irish nationalism alongside its failure 
to deliver; at a deeper level it evoked the impotence of the embodied self 
and its betrayal by instrumentalised language.
There is an echo here of James Joyce, who exiled himself from Ireland 
because he could find no place as a speaking subject under conditions 
established by English colonial rule and a reactionary Irish identity founded 
in pre-Christian myth (precisely the ‘lost’ past that Fanon rejected). In A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, following a meeting with his English 
dean of studies, Stephen Dedalus says: “My soul frets in the shadow of his 
language.”9 With Finnegans Wake Joyce conducted what Seamus Deane 
calls a “Babelian act of war” against English, in which writing was not to 
be the foundation of a new subjectivity for this notoriously itinerant writer, 
but a re-founding of language itself through the ludic humour of phonetic 
puns, Gaelic syntax, ployglot neologisms, and above all embodied speech.10 
Finnegans Wake is inscrutable unless read aloud, preferably with an Irish 
accent. Likewise, Coleman is very particular about what Roland Barthes 
called the ‘grain of the voice’ as a transmitter of the sensible, redeploying the 
visual with a material speech rooted in storytelling traditions.11 
Jimmie Durham’s trajectory is uncannily similar. He exiled himself from 
the United States, a political entity to which, he says, as a Cherokee he never 
belonged anyway. When asked about his nomadic exile he said: “It’s my 
ambition to become a homeless orphan. I don’t want to be at home,” where 
home means ‘secure knowledge’, ‘mastery’, ‘lack of doubt’—in other words, 
freedom from those violent forms of identity and subjectivity to which the 
disenfranchised ‘other’ is subjected.12 Although speaking from a crisis in 
Native American subjectivity (in a persistent ‘state of emergency’), Durham’s 
work has never offered an illustrative or autobiographical account. Instead, 
it presents a provocation to the language codes and visual conventions by 
which the subject is constructed and subjected to forms of power. Much 
of his work in the US articulated around seriocomic commentaries on 
white America’s representations of ‘Indians’: scripto-visual, faux-primitive 
drawings, and sculptures made from found junk. Typical of his style of 
misdirection was On Loan from the Museum of the American Indian, 1985, 
a spoof on the ethnographic museum display and white presumptions of 
native ‘primitiveness’: a parasitisation of authoritative language that barely 
concealed a tragic human loss.
Durham’s work in Europe continues to challenge prescribed 
subjectivities and ways of thinking. In the short video 13 rue Fénelon (1995) 
we see a quiet street corner where nothing happens, until a rock smashes 
through a glass shop-front, surprisingly from the inside. While this and 
other similar sculptural gestures are ‘violent,’ they are also encounters that 
9. James Joyce, A 
Portrait of the Artist  
As a Young Man (1916), 
(London: Penguin, 
1996), 215.
10. Seamus Deane, 
‘Introduction’ to James 
Joyce, Finnegans 
Wake, (1939), (London: 
Penguin, 1992),  
vii – xlix.
11. Roland Barthes, 
‘The Grain of the 
Voice,’ Image-Music-
Text, trans. S. Heath, 
(London: Fontana 
Press, 1977).
12. Jimmie Durham, 
Jimmie Durham, 
Fondazione Antonio 
Ratti, (Milan: Edizione 
Charta, 2004), 123 – 125
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13. Sigmund Freud, 
‘Humour’ (1927), in 
Freud 14: Art and 
Literature, trans. 
James Strachey, 
(Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1988), 
427 – 433.
induce a change in material state. Common tropes in Durham’s work are 
finding, associating and re-motivating objects and words such that the 
concealed or overlooked becomes manifest. Durham’s stated intentions are 
to open a space of doubt and confusion in which the viewer is not belittled 
or intimidated but encouraged to think. Humour is one of his traits, but it 
is not the humour of Freud’s ‘Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious,’ 
which concerns mastery over the ‘other’, but of the later essay—a humour 
that “smiles through tears,” which concerns the self ’s amelioration of 
traumatic life.13 
Emily Jacir’s work seems close to Durham’s insofar as she too, speaks 
from crisis without illustrating it, seeking to challenge the credibility of 
hegemonic truth. Although the controversial project, Material for a Film—
retracing Wael Zuaiter, 2003, has been accused of being partisan, its intent 
is rather to confront us with the violence of our own prejudices. Among 
these is the conflation of Arab (multi-faith) ethnicity with Islam, which 
turns a colonial dispute over territory into a religious conflict. This, I 
suspect, was the problem behind the fate of Jacir’s project, stazione, for the 
Palestine c/o Venice event at the Venice Biennale 2009. The intention of 
stazione was to celebrate Venice’s historic maritime relation with the East 
Mediterranean, notable as a station for Christian pilgrims on the way to the 
Holy Land. The idea, initially approved, was to add Arabic translations to 
the names of the vaporetto stops on Line 1, which runs through the Grand 
Canal past several palazzi displaying Arabic design influences. The project 
alluded to the often forgotten shared history of European and Arabic 
cultures, including the contribution of Arabic lyric poetry to the troubadour 
tradition. The canal provided a compelling metaphor: a neutral zone in 
which ideological positions are suspended. Each stop is a momentary pause 
in a journey where the traveller may change direction; analogously, at each 
stop, the Arabic script would create an unexpected interference prompting 
a different awareness of cultural space. In addition, the project reflected the 
nature of the Biennale itself as a temporary rendezvous of contemporary 
artist-troubadours: a site of exchange and migration of aesthetic ideas 
and experiences. stazione was an elegant secular project, whose political 
dimension resided in interpretative extrapolations from the relations to 
which it alludes. Alas, it was abruptly cancelled without explanation. 
What I am attempting to present is an art that intervenes at the interface 
of subjects to ask whether there are not other truths of reality than those 
marketed by dominant ideologies. Herman Melville wrote, 
in this world of lies, Truth is forced to fly like a sacred white doe in 
the woodlands; and only by cunning glimpses will she reveal herself, 
as in Shakespeare and other masters of the great Art of Telling the 
Truth—even though it be covertly, and by snatches.14 
I am not concerned with some Platonic transcendental Truth, if this is what 
Melville meant, but with how we might think “cunning glimpses” of truths 
that matter to lived reality. So we shall now turn to the hermeneutic figure 
of cunning, trickster, which is neither ethnic specific nor confined to some 
pre-modern past.
It was through doing background research on Durham’s work that I 
inevitably encountered the Native American trickster, central to narrative 
traditions and native hermeneutics. Although trickster appears in earlier 
post-encounter Native American tales satirising the white man, it is 
remobilised in literature and art as a symbolic vector of anti-colonial 
resistance and cultural resurgence from the 1970s on. This is also true for 
contemporary expressions of trickster in African and African diasporic 
literature and film;15 and, of course, Henry Louis Gates’ theoretical work 
on ‘signifyin’ monkey,’ about which he says, “[trickster] provokes a re-
translation of the given world by cunning and a skilful, often humorous 
articulation of the corporeal and the linguistic.”16
Cultural anthropology frames trickster as a character, which misses 
the point that it is not a subject in Western narrative terms, but a tropic 
figure; and its world is not anthropocentric but cosmogonic—world-
transforming—aimed not at individual but collective renewal. None of the 
artists quoted above either illustrate or personify trickster; but they reveal 
the bricoleur’s re-articulation of material—words, images and objects—
mobilised towards a critical interrogation of the languages of dominance 
typical of trickster tropes. 
A way out of anthropology may be found through the work of 
mythographer Karl Kerényi. He suggested that Nietzsche’s dualistic division 
14. Herman Melville, 
‘Hawthorne and his 
Mosses’, The Literary 
World, August 17 and 
24, 1850 http://www.
ibiblio.org/eldritch/nh/
hahm.html
15. For example, 
Melvin van Peebles’ 
film Sweet Sweetback’s 
Badaaaas Song; Patrick 
Chamoiseau’s novels 
Solibo Magnificent and 
Texaco; Ishmael Reed’s 
Mumbo Jumbo; and 
Amos Tutuola’s The 
Palm-Wine Drinkard. 
16. Henry Louis Gates 
Jr, Figures in Black: 
Words, Signs and the 
‘Racial’ Self, (Oxford: 
Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 54.
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of human culture into the rational Apollonian and the non-rational 
Dionysian should be supplemented by a third aspect, the Hermetic. The 
Hermetic, spelt with a capital H, refers to Hermes, the classical Greek 
trickster-messenger, not directly to alchemy. Kerényi describes it as “a 
specific quality in the nature, achievements, and life patterns of mankind, 
as well as the corresponding traits of roguery to be found on the surface 
of man’s world.”17 It is not a transcendental figure, but is grounded in 
body-world transactions concerned with agency, communicability and 
interpretation. As Gates says of trickster, it does not signify some thing but a 
way of doing that opens onto the indeterminacy of interpretation.18
For Michel Serres, true communication means not the passive relay of 
information but an active, transformative relation that necessarily includes 
difference and translation, without which nothing significant can be 
communicated. Serres’ focus is therefore on mediation. In contemplating 
what activates a successful communication, he concludes that it requires 
contradictory conditions: the presence of noise (interference), since a signal 
can be distinguished only against a background of noise; and total exclusion 
of what it needs to include, namely, noise.19 Serres names this the ‘parasite,’ 
the uninvited guest at the host’s dinner table who disrupts the established 
order, which can only be restored by excluding it; but disequilibrium has 
already transformed relations. The parasite obeys the logic of the excluded 
third and the included third: 
a producer and inducer, not of a meaning, but exactly of a direction, 
excluding others, including the meaning/direction that leads to the 
collapse of the system and to its perpetual renewal.20
Among Serres’ other ‘excluded thirds’ are Hermes and the troubadour, 
vectors that are characterised by a non-place: “neither positioned nor 
opposed, increasingly exposed.”21 
The troubadour, implied in Jacir’s work, re-enters my narrative through 
the work of Sonia Boyce. Troubadours (men and women) were travelling 
composers assigned to courts—much like contemporary artists have 
residencies—whose songs often concerned the politics of the day. Their 
origins may lie in the transmission of Arabic song into Europe via Al-
Andalus. The word troubadour or trouvère means both ‘trope’ and ‘finder.’ 
17. Karl Kerényi, 
Mythology and 
Humanism, The 
Correspondence of 
Thomas Mann and 
Karl Kerényi, trans. 
Alexander Gelley, 
(Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University 
Press, 1975), 9
.
18. Henry Louis Gates 
Jr, Figures in Black, 
p 239. See also Gates, 
The Signifying Monkey: 
A Theory of African-
American Literary 
Criticism, (Oxford: 
Oxford University 
Press, 1988).
19. Michel Serres, 
Hermes: Literature, 
Science, Philosophy, 
(eds.) Josué V. Hari 
and David F. Bell, 
(Baltimore & London: 
The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982), 
xxv-xxvi and 66-67.
20. Michel Serres, 
The Parasite, trans 
Lawrence R Schehr, 
(Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982), 
187 – 88.
21. Michel Serres, 
The Troubadour of 
Knowledge, trans 
Sheila Faria Glaser 
with William Paulson, 
(Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 
1997), 12.
 
Serres describes it as the creator who does not seek but finds, linking 
knowledge and learning to travel, encountering, crossing frontiers and 
the “felicitous use of language.”22 Like trickster—or Oscar Wilde’s dandy—
troubadour engages in unequal exchange: food for hot air, as Serres says—
the measurable for the all-or-nothing of art. 
Boyce has been interested in Serres’ parasitic trope both as a means of 
challenging the stereotypical identity imposed on her as a black British artist 
and as a way of exploring art’s sociality through projects involving singing 
and carnival. The collaborative work, For you, only you, 2007, began with 
an invitation to work with Magdalen College Chapel, Oxford University. 
Boyce chose to stage a vocal performance in the space, and appointed two 
disparate performers as collaborators: Mikhail Karikis, a Greek performance 
artist specialising in modernist vocalisations drawing on all body cavities; 
and the Early Music choir, Alamire, directed by David Skinner. Karikis and 
Skinner agreed to work with a motet, Tu solus qui facis mirabilia, by the 
Franco-Flemish Renaissance composer Josquin Desprez, which Karikis 
rescored using call-and-response. The collaboration was performed in the 
Chapel to an Oxford audience whose expectations were, needless to say, 
confounded.23 
The motet is a choral form in which each word syllable is given its own 
musical note—that is, a rigid structure incompatible with modern vocal 
styles. In effect, Boyce forced a syncopic moment, in which each performer 
had to modify its identity to accommodate the other’s difference. Since 
authorship was distributed across a range of collaborators, her role was 
invisible and ambiguous. One might say she functioned as the ‘finder’ and 
catalyst of a transforming signifying chain, relating to the relation itself, not 
to the points of emission or reception. As Serres writes, the producers play 
the contents, the para-site the position; but s/he who plays the position plays 
the relation between subjects, and is thus the master. Is this then the real 
space of political agency? 
What I have outlined so far are artistic tactics that seek agency through 
resistance to hegemonic truth claims. But I shall now turn to a paradox 
raised by Herman Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener.24 One might assume 
that in the present context the author’s The Confidence-Man would be 
22. Michel Serres, 
The Troubadour of 
Knowledge, p 104. 
23. For you, only you:  
A project by Sonia 
Boyce, (Oxford: Ruskin 
School of Drawing and 
Fine Art, 2007). 
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NJ: Melville House 
Publishing, 2008).
more appropriate, since it deliberately plays with Hermetic tropes and the 
discursive elaborations typical of oral storytelling. But Bartleby is the ghost 
haunting this text.
Bartleby the Scrivener has received considerable interpretative 
commentary, but from my point of view, it presents a kõan—a mote inside 
the eye of the law. I shall call this mote imagination, because the first thing 
that Bartleby ‘would prefer not to’ is his work as a law-copyist—a role that 
prohibits imaginative thought. Bartleby—about whom we are told next to 
nothing (he is another ‘homeless orphan’)—is not a character, subject, or 
hero, but a paradoxical tropic figure, whose primary trait (non-compliance, 
or suspension of communication) is always already embedded in Hermetic 
ambivalence. It presents an attenuated syncopic suspension of time. But 
is Bartleby’s indifference to power a gesture of resignation that offers no 
hope of agency? Is doing nothing still doing something? As it happens, 
this question is presupposed in the reverse axiom, ‘Sometimes making 
something leads to nothing,’ which underlies Francis Alÿs’s action Paradox 
of Praxis 1 (1997) where he pushed a block of ice round Mexico City until it 
melted away. 
One can say that Bartleby’s in-action prompts action by others: they are 
forced into decisions. Like other artistic tactics I have described, Bartleby 
presents a reproach to social demands for conformity: “I know you,” he says 
to the lawyer, “and I want nothing to say to you.” Bartleby the Scrivener is a 
cautionary tale that exposes the duplicitous nature of power. Its significance 
lies in asking the reader to recognise subjectivity as an artifice of language 
that betrays the self ’s imaginative potential. As The Confidence-Man makes 
clear, Melville is concerned with the means by which understanding is 
transmitted, where the paradoxical and polysemous nature of language 
persistently threatens to undermine epistemic certainty: the obligation of 
meaning is deferred to the reader, who engages in an act of interpretation 
that is itself a part of the creative process. 
Bartleby comes to mind in relation to Alÿs, another ‘homeless’ exile also 
known, like Durham, for absurdist gestures. And like Boyce, Alÿs has often 
deferred authorship to others, notably the copyist, as in his collection of 
found amateur paintings of Fabiola, where a collective sameness is revealed 
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as a plurality of singularities. That Alÿs himself is concerned with art’s 
relation to the political is clear in the walk he performed in Jerusalem (2004) 
designed to test the axioms, Sometimes doing something poetic can become 
political and sometimes doing something political can become poetic. Note his 
emphasis on ‘doing,’ recalling the Hermetic as not signifying some thing but 
a way of doing. In Jerusalem Alÿs was faced with a divisive political situation 
that invited taking up partisan positions; but, in effect, he preferred not to. 
He began with a map reference: the line drawn on a map of Jerusalem 
with a thick grease pencil by Moishe Dayan following the Arab border 
war in 1949. Known as the ‘green line,’ it was intended to separate Israeli 
and Palestinian territories, and yet any boundary inexorably unites as it 
separates. But the map line represents a tract of land several metres wide—
so who owned the wide of the line? Alÿs walked this line with green paint 
dribbled from a punctured can. The extended work is a DVD projection 
of his journey, reframed by audiotaped interviews that discuss the 
sociopolitical consequences of the ‘green line’ from Palestinian and Israeli 
perspectives, not all of which are favourably disposed towards Alÿs’s gesture. 
Alÿs occupied no definable subjective position, literally withdrawing to the 
ambivalent, non-place of the boundary itself, where no one has the authority 
to speak: an aporia (a psychic and political impasse) but topographically 
porous. In parasitised this non-place of indeterminacy, Alÿs also parasitized 
the founding political gesture of its inscription, never established by law, 
disclosing the absurd but tragic paralysis of communication that this 
enforced. In other words, Alÿs’s absurdist gesture avoided partisan politics, 
or ‘contents,’ whilst opening a space to consider the contingent play of 
relations that constitute political power. 
Derrida’s description of Bartleby’s gestures as “response without 
response,”25 may fit Alÿs’s gesture of responding to a situation without 
responding overtly to its politics and parallels the underlying ethics of 
James Coleman’s work; but it also recalls what Michel de Certeau said about 
strategies that ‘navigate’ and often ‘short-circuit’ or ‘substitute’ a set of social 
rules. “Analogy,” he writes, 
is the foundation of all these procedures, which are transgressions 
of the symbolic order and the limits it sets. They are camouflaged 
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transgressions, inserted metaphors and, precisely in that measure, 
they become acceptable, taken as legitimate since they respect the 
distinctions established by language even as they undermine them. 
From this point of view, to acknowledge the authority of rules is 
exactly the opposite of applying them.
He adds, rather presciently: “This fundamental chiasm may be returning 
today, since we have to apply laws whose authority we no longer 
recognise.”26 
In sum, the Hermetic aspect in art works in and against the linguistic, 
material and emotional realities of the sociopolitical to disclose the extent 
to which we are framed and constrained by ideologies and representations 
that cripple our capacity to imagine other ways of being in and interpreting 
the world. It neither rejects power nor acquiesces to it, but parasitizes and 
interrupts its channels of communication to provoke encounters with 
difference. This provocation encourages a loss of subjective certitude from 
which we may acquire a different perception of reality. Such art practices 
present a profoundly ethical challenge, for they entreat the viewer to engage 
with the struggle for social justice in a political and economic landscape 
bereft of ethics and scarred by violence and dissimulation. My only—
provisional—conclusion is that this ethical battle is best fought on the side 
of the victims not the victors of history.
The above is a revised version of the Norma U Lifton Lecture, School of the 
Art Institute of Chicago, November 2009.
